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NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS
Sam 0. McCord
Leonard G. \\ e/d

Introduction
The concern engendered by the triple-digit federal budget deficit calls for
consideration of any actions that could help alleviate the deficit burden. Since
an integral part of solving this problem is economic growth, 1he proper allocation of economic resources must be achieved so that growth can help the
United States control its massive federal debt.
The purpo e of this paper 1s 10 discuss an area of poliC} I) that could be
revised 10 enhance the use of economic assets, and 2) that presently transfers millions of dollars 10 foreign governments and industries from the U.S.
public, thereby exacerbating the problem of IO\\ savings. The policy referred
to is the increasing u e of non-tariff trade barriers ( TBs) by the United
States. In this paper, economic theory and the results of the esumated lost
tax re\'enue are pre ented co demonscra1e the cosc 10 1he econom:,, of using
TBs.
on-Tariff Trade Barriers
TBs take many different forms. Some, like packaging and qualil} requirements seem harmless; others, like quotas or voluntar; export res1rict1ons, are 0\erl measures co restnct imporcs. ogucs, Olechow ski, and
Winters (1986) provide a cursory review of five categories of TBs: I) quantitative import restrictions, 2) voluntary exporc restram1s, 3) measures to enforce decreed prices, 4) tariff-like methods, and 5) monitoring measures.
These categories are presented in Table I along with the members of each
group and a short description or definition.
TBs were more prevalent at the end of the 1980s than e\cr before
(Deardorff, 1987; Nogucs, Olechowski, and Winters, 1986; Coughlin and
Wood , 1989). As tariffs and tariff revenue began 10 fall in the 1930s, TBs
increased. The average level of tariffs in industrial countries was reduced
from about 400"10 m the mid-1930s 10 approximately 4%-81r'o by the end of
the 1970s ( agues, Olechowski, and Winters, I986). For the United States,
the a\'erage tariff rate on all im porcs declined between 1946 and 1987 from
10.3% to 3.507o (Tarr, 1989).
In a landmark arcicle, Bhagwa1i (1965) established analytically that without
perfectly competitive markets, quotas and tariffs a re not equivalent. That
is, in imperfectly competitive markets, a 1ariff and a quota may have 1he
same effect on the imporced quantity, but a different effect on the domestic
price or level of domestic production.
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Table I
on-Tariff Trade Barriers
1. Quantitative Import Restrictions
a) Pro hibitions or embargoes - may be complete or partial, absolute or
cond itional.
b) Q uotas - ceili ngs specified in terms of value or quantit 1 ; may be for
a speci fi c period of time, seasonal, or country specific, or combinat1om
c) Discretionary Import Authorizations - permi~s1on to import is granted at the d iscretion of authorities in the importing country.
10

d) Conditional Import Authorizations - permission to import is subject
commitments by the importer or domestic supply.

2. Voluntary Export Re!>trainl'>
Are agreements between importmg and exportmg nations as to a maximum a mount of exports to be purchased \\llhm a given period ol time. The
"voluntary" action is usually taken to a,01d more formal quantity restraints,
such as quota restrictions.
3. Measures For the Enforcement of Decreed Price,
a) Variable levies - import charge, set to equalize the import price and
domestic price.
b) Mi nimum price systems - a minimum import price is set by the im·
porting country and import prices belo" the decreed minimum trigger an
addiuonal duty or penalty.
c) Voluntary export price re,traints - similar to 2 abo, e. but 1, an agreement about a minimum price to be honored by the exporter.
4. Tariff•t}pe M easures
a) Tariff quotas - tariff rates differ as the quantity or imported goods
mcrease.
b) Seasonal tariffs - different tariff rates apply to the ,ame agricul1Ural
product according to the season.
5. Monitoring Measures
a) Price and volume im·estigauons - can re,ult 1n 1mpound111g of goods,
temporary suspending of import licenses, and general disruption of imports:
can be an effective way of elici ting "voluntary" export restramts.
b) Anti-dumping and countervailing duties - du ties levied on products
sold in the importing cou ntry at lower price than in the exporting country.
Source: Nogues, O lechowski, and Winters ( 1986).
Assuming global markets are not perfectly competitive, the effects of tariffs
a nd NTBs are not equivalent. T herefore, there must be other reasons to prefer
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TBs over tariffs. Deardorff ( 1987) presents several arguments to explain
why TBs are favo red over tariffs; these are summarized in Table 2. The
first argument is that institutional constraints may preclude tariffs. The most
significant of these constraints is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Participants of GATT agree to mutual restrictions on the use of
tariffs. The existence of GATT, however, compou nds the problem instead
of providing an answer. Why do the participating nauom agree to limit tariffs
but virtually ignore TBs?
Another institutional cons1raint within the United Sta1es is separation of
powers. The p0\\er to levy tariffs is delegated to Congress, leav111g the executive branch 10 search for 01her means of 1mpos111g 1rade restraints.
Imperfect competi1ion also favors TBs. A domesuc monopol} (perhaps
oligopoly, e.g., automobiles) fac111g multiple foreign fi rms opera1cs 111 a compe1i1ive marke1 as long as 1here is free 1rade. Imposing iariffs ra1 es the domcsuc price above the \\Orld price, but the domcsuc monopoly s1ill faces a
compe1itive market. With 1he quoia restraint, the domesuc firm can raise
prices fa r above the \\Orld price as II moves back up 1he domestic demand
curve acting as a monopolist.
Table 2
\\- h) on-Tariff Trade Barrier\
Are Farnred O\er Tariff\

Institutional Constraints - fails; why aren'1

TBs restricted as well as tariffs?

Imperfect Competition - fails; tariffs rcm0\C monopohst1c distortions.
Fear of Re1alia11on - fails; \\hy \\OUld gO\crnmcnts rctaltatc less aga1ns1
than 1ariffs?

TBs

Rent Seeking by Governments - fails; does not generally exist.
Uncertainty - fatls; the assumpuons made by analytical models do not conform to fact. TBs are enacted 111 reaction to market movements rather than
in anticipauon of market movements.
Perception That Tariffs Will ot Work - accepted; most of 1he methods in
Table I can not be overcome by export country subsidies/supports 10 exporters.
Source: Deardorff ( 1987).
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Figure I demonstrates the price and quantity effects of a quota. Line DD
represents the U.S. import demand curve for an item produced domestically
and by foreign competition. The foreign supply curve (the supply curve for
imports into the United States) for the item is SS. With free trade, the United States will import Qr units and pay a price of P r per unit. If an import
quota of Qq is imposed by the United States, the import supply curve becomes vertical at Qq- Therefore, the import supply curve is kinked at C and
becomes SCS'. The quota reduces the quantity of imports from Q 1 to Qq,
the domestic price rises from P 1 to P q, and the foreign price falls from P 1
to Pb because of excess supply on the foreign markets. The higher domestic price reduces total U.S. consumption of the good, but increases U.S.
production. Therefore, U.S. producers of the good benefit at the expense
of U.S. consumers in general. From the standpoint of social welfare, it is
clear that, to avoid the price distortion due to the monopoly, the government should prefer the tariff to NTBs.
It takes liule imagination to see that the same result (higher domestic price
due to reduced imports) is achieved with Voluntary Export Restrictions
(VERs) by a major foreign competitor. For example, in early I 981 Japan
adopted VE Rs for automobiles. As expected (see Collyns and Dunawa}-,
1987), U.S. consumer prices for all automobiles increa ed. The Japanese began to emphasize more luxurious models with higher profit margins. Demand
fell for imports, and U.S. producers increased their market share b, 6. 750-0.

Figure I
The Price and Quantil) Effect!> of a Quota
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Deardorff's ( 1987) third argument is that foreign governments may retaliate aga111st an increa e in tanffs. Aga111, the author points out that the use
of NTBs in place of tariffs clearly shows a preference but not what drives
that preference. Why would TBs be less like!; to prompt retaliation?
Deardorff (1987) al o attempts to expla111 the preference for TBs through
rent seeking by the government. Rather than e,tablish import restrictions
the government could sell or auction off the import nghb. Tarr ( 1989) report~
a study by Hamilton ( 1988) on the rights to export textile and apparel to
the United States. Under the original '.\1uluf1ber Arrangement (MFA) signed
111 1974, individual who hold the nghts 10 e,port can ,ell those nghts. Given
the competition 111 the textile market, the price for the right to export to the
United States ,hould equal the premium earned on the sale of goods in the
U111ted States. Tarr ( 1989) estimate, that the capture of quota rents on textiles and apparel in 1984 would ha,e amounted to approximately $7. I billion Deardorff (198-,) points out, ho\,e,er, that quota nghts are not normally
auctioned or sold, but merely granted An e,ample 1, the U.S. distribution
of sugar import quotas.
The 1\gmulture and rood \ct ol 1981 established a market stabilization
price (\ISP) for sugar. The \1",P \,as ong111all, ma111ta111ed through tariffs
and import fees. Ho\,e,er. the sharp decline in \\Orld sugar prices in 1982
resulted in the federal go, ernment 's establishing an emergenc, import quota program The r quota ,hares created are allocated b, the executive branch.
The quotas for Nicaragua and South Africa ha,e been resc111ded, but those
for [I Sahador, Co,ta Rica, and l-londura, ha,e been increased. Maskus
( 198") e,umate, that appro:,,.imatcl, S700 million "a, tramferred 10 quota
0\\ ner<, during the 1982-83 quota year and appro,1mately $300 million during the 1986-87 quota year. l hese figures are ba,ed on the difference bet\,een L, S and world price, adjusted for dutie, The price differential peaked
111 JunL, 1985, \\hen domestic sugar pnces exceeded world prices by 77607o!
Uncertaint, i, another reason to fa,or '\,l Bs o,er tariffs. Recent analy11cal model\ ,l;o,, that quotas are ,uperior to tariffs. assuming a preference
lor risk a,ersion. Ho\\eH:r, the fatal na,, pointed out by Deardorff is that
the logical ,equence of the models docs not match tact In the analyucal
models, quotas are selected gi,en uncertaint) 111 market changes; in reality,
quota, arc 11mitutcd alter change, in market conditions. Quotas are reactions 10 change,, not predictions ol change. fhi, reaction to change I illustrated b; the enactment of a sugar import quota program in \1ay 1982 as
a result of the sharp decline in ,,orld,,ide sugar prices in early 1982 ( 1askus,
1987).
r inally, Deardorff concludes that TBs, ,pecil1call, quotas, a re enacted
rather than tariffs because lobby groups believe that tariffs "ill not work.
Deardorff assumes that trade restncuons are 111s111u1ed to undo harm or prevent further harm 10 domestic ,,orkers and firms.
A tan ff might be offset by subsidies from a foreign government to an ~xporting firm, but a quota cannot be offset by foreign subsidies. Dumping
by foreign suppliers 1s a si milar fear, but a quota would effectively negate
that possibility.
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The growt h of foreign competition over time will cause the import s uppl y
curve to drift slo,.,,ly outward. Although this drift can be countered with an
increasing tariff, that tariff can be misinterpreted as a protectionist measure. A quota needs no adJustment.
Prernlence of "1on-Tariff Trade Barriers
Nogues, Olechowski and Winters ( 1986) use three measures to a\\es, the
extent of TB,. For 16 industrial countries, the authors calculate I) the ~TB,
o n imports d1v1ded by the total value of the country's imports, 2) the NTBs
on impons d1\ided b} \\Orld trade ot the commodities affected, and 3) the
frequenq ,, 1th ,.,,hich countries impose TBs on commodity impom. Their
overall asses-ment is that T lh "at lect more than 27°0 of all import, and
more than 34o·o of imports from de,eloping countries" (I\Jogues et al .. 1986.
p. 181)
Coughlin and \\ood dl\close that, in 10 European Community countries
and 6 other industrial countries, the dollar, alue of a countn ', import, ,ubJect to "hard core non-tariff barrier," has increased 2.6°'o from 1981 to 1986
( 1989, p 35) The L:nited States led these increases ,, ith a 5 90'o increase.
One ,,eakne" of their ,1ud1e,, acknO\dedgcd b; both '-oguc, et al.. and
Coughlin and \\ood, \\a, their inab1lit} to mea,ure the "intensity" ol the
change in Nl B-. The; ,,ere onl) able to mca,urc the chJngc 111 the co,cragc
ratio, ,, hich 1, defined a, the , alue ot imports ,ubJect 10 TBs di\ ided by
the total value of impom (Coughlin and Wood, 1989) for c,amplc, ii the
total \Jlue of import, ot one product lor countr) '\" 100. and X imported
10 ol that product lrom countr} 'I ,,ith no ',18, . .i QO'o co,eragc ratio
results If country '\ ·, imports t rom 'I are reduced to a value of $5 due to
the 1mpo'1t10n of ', T Ih. the protccuon become, , 3 To ( 5 95) It the '-l B
eliminates country '\ ·, import, from Y, the co,cragc ratw becomes 0° o
( 0 90). As in the first rn,c, no imports arc ,ubject to l B,, lea, ing the
numerator at 0. Thu,, the "mtemit," of l B, are not mea,urcd cllccti,ely b) thi, method.

Co<,h of '\on-1 arin Tradl' Barril'r,
I he cmts ot TB, 10 the general public arc higher plllduct 1mce,, )united
\Cle..:uon of product,. ml',allo..:ation ol resource, to,tL ed b) the art 11.:1all)
high prices, Jnd doll,1r-. ,,a,ted admi1m1ernw the TB program, \\ h) are
thew co-.1, tolcrateu·> Ray ( 1981) pro, ide-. a ,1mple e,plana11on 1ntormauon about the results of trade pohc1e, i, costly to obtain and must be updat ed tor changmg market cond111on,. The mdi,idual LOnsumer ha, little
incentive to bear the cost of gathering the 111formauon and deciphering 11,
meaning. Thi, argument 1s similar to Copeland and Ingram', ( 1983) c,plana11on ot voter decision making in public e lections.
faen 1f an mdividual is ,,illing to bear the coM, the publit\ perception
1s that one person ca nnot change po licy; therefore, gat hering the intorma11011 serves no useful purpose. Imported items ma} not be purchased that
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freq uentl y (one car, one stereo, one T. V .), and the effort to effect a change
does not result in a savings large enough to justify the costs incurred . But
producer ' wealth i more directly affected by trade policie ; that is, their
economic incentive are much greater. Producers can form industry groups
to stay abrea t of pol icie that affect their wealth. This asymmetry of information fo ters policies that protect the industries at the consumers' expense.
One way to a ses the consequences of TBs 1s to examme the effect on
tax revenues of replacing tariffs with TBs. A look at federal receipts reveals a steady decline in customs duue . Table 3 shO\\S that customs duties
have fallen from a high of 371T'o of total federal re\enue in 1902 to the cu rrent l.71T'o - or from well 0\er I 3 of federal re\enue 10 only about 1/ 100.
Tarr ( 1989) estimates that to impose tariff\ on the econom} equal to the hidden tariffs in the TBs on steel, autos, and textiles alone wou ld require a
tariff rate of apprrnamately 251T'o. The shortfall is enher made up by additional taxes or added to the federal deficn
Estima ting the Effect<, of

I

T B!>

Estimating the effects of TBs is an extremely complex task. The re earcher
must take into account the c.hanges in price of products affected, employment in the industry producing the imported good, and the shift in wage
levels caused by the change in policy. lf the product subJect to the TB is
a primary ra,, material (such as steel), the effects ripple through other industries. If employment changes, \\ hat are the d1sloca11on co ts to the worker, and ,,hat 1s the likely level of the ne\, employment \,age? What are the
cost sa\ings of not monnoring an TB program? Reasonable estimations
depend on the ela ticit} of demand used in the model.
T able 3
C u toms Duties a<, a P ercentage of
Total Fede ral Rc \ cnuc
(MM)

( MM)

(MM)

(MM)

( B)

(B)

YEAR

1902

1940

1950

1960

1970

1987

TTL REV

653

7,000

43,527

99,800

192.8

842.4

DUTIES

243

2,127

7,843

1,105

2.4

14 .4

PERCENT

37%

30\

18\

1%

1%

1. 7%

Source: I 988 Statistical A bstract of the United Sta tes a nd H istorical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970.
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------------------------Tarr (1989) has attempted the somewhat more manageable task of estimating the effects of NTBs in the textile, auto, and steel industries. Using 1984
data, Tarr analyzes the would-be effects of removing quota restrictions in
all three industries simultaneously and separately. Only the simultaneous
removal is reviewed here. The results are based on the central estimate of
elasticity rather than the high or low estimates.
Tarr (1989) estimates that the annual benefit of simultaneously removing
quota restrictions in all three industries would amount to $20.9 billion. The
$20.9 billion is the aggregate of estimated first- and second-order effects.
The first-order effect is that U.S. consumers pay less for all products subject to the removal of restrictions, and foreign suppliers no longer receive
prices above the world market price. This effect leaves consumers with excess money to spend or save. The decline in the U.S. private savings rate
exacerbates the deficit. Investment for growth can only come from savings
or borrowing, and the U.S. national savings rate is lower than in other major
industrialized countries (Coopers & Lybrand, 1989).
The second-order effect is the distortion cost of consumption and production. Removing the consumption distortion means customers "ill ,·alue the
now lower priced products differently than before. Demand for the e products
will rise because the increase in relative value is based on the new lower price.
The production distortion is removed because some domestic industries will
now shift production to more profitable areas. Similarly, industries using
these previously restricted goods will have a less expensive source of inputs,
allowing the industries to lower prices, pay higher wages, or increase
dividends.
If the medium labor supply ela ticity is u ed, the effect of quota removal
on the labor force is a negligible - .2% . The three industrie affected lo e
approximately I 74,000 jobs 10 other sectors in the economy. Gi,en the cost
to the economy of $20.9 billion, the co t to protect the jobs in these industries is about £ I 20,000 per job (Tarr 1989).
Workers incur displacement costs for job search, relocation, and retraining. Comparing the earning stream of displaced workers to non-displaced
workers gives a proxy for those costs. Comparing the pre ent value of the
adjustment losses 10 the present value of the quota removal for six years after removal reveals that for every $1 lost by displaced workers, the economy
gains $65 (Tarr 1989).
One effect that was 1101 supported is the "McDonald " effect: the loss
of higher paying protected job resulting in a shift of employees to lower
paying jobs like those at a fast-food re tau rant. In none of the imulations
"does the real wage decrease by as much as .2%" (Tarr 1989, p. 7-7).
Tarr (I 989) does not include sugar quota removal in his estimates of costs
to the economy. Maskus (1987, p. 24) does provide an estimate based on
a partial-equilibri um model with "highly conservative estimates of demand
and supply elasticities." At current levels of consumption, U.S. consumers
would save a pproximately $1.3 bill ion annually.
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Conclusion,
Economic rents are being transferred from the U.S. public to fo reign exporters at a time when the United States is experiencing the lowest savings
rate in decades and the federal budget deficit 1s stated in hundreds of billions. Since budge1-cu11ing measures alone cannot solve the deficit and any
tax increase appears to be a polttical anathema, more a11ention should be
given to possible free-trade solutiom. The present system of TBs is negating many of the trade agreements made under GATT - that 1s, tariffs are
being reduced, but TBs are being mcrea ed. Dunng the 1980s, the United
States was generally recogni?Cd as a world leader m promoting free trade.
Yet from 1981 to 1986, the Un11ed States \vas a \\Orld leader in increasing
TBs. Welfare costs in excess of approximate!, $22.2 billion annually could
be avoided b, removing TB, m four indmtrics: ,teel, textiles, auto , and
sugar. The tanff rate required 10 equal those costs is approx1ma1el, 25010.
In other \\Ords, the Un11ed States has offset tan ff rcducuom agreements over
the last fort) 1ear \\ 11h TBs. r 1nal11 , \\llh the possible am val of the Single European \1arket in the lancr 1990s, and the increasingly intense economic compe1i11on from the Pacific Rim countnes, the united States cannot
afford 10 risk retaliauon by those countne, w1th TBs.
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